Patricia L. Sullivan, an assistant professor at the University of Georgia's School of Public and International Affairs recently completed a study advancing a new model which predicts a nation's probability of accomplishing military objectives. Sullivan's research, reported in the June issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution and by the UGA Office of Public Affairs News Service, found that since WWII major countries, including the United States, the Soviet Union, Russia, China, Britain or France, have failed in 39% of 122 military objectives against smaller, weaker nations.
Under a grant funded by the National Science Foundation and institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Sullivan conducted research to explain the "circumstances under which more powerful nations are likely to fail and creates a model that allows policymakers to calculate the probability of success in current and future conflicts, "according to the UGA News Service.
Factors which Sullivan found important are the objective, the nature of the target, whether or not the target cooperates with the objective, whether the target or country initiating the action has allies, whether allies will intervene on either side, and the military strength or weakness of allies.
The factor most easily defined is the objective. The objective is the reason for military intervention. Objective, in Sullivan's model, is based on a continuum from "brute force" to "coercion." According to UGA News Service, the nature of the target is defined by the type of group which composes the target: guerilla, formal nation states, or terrorists. Examining these factors allows you to draw some conclusions about the odds of winning a military conflict.
Of the factors Sullivan identified the most important as whether the objective can be reached by military strength alone, or if target cooperation is essential in the military objective.
Sullivan explains that in the 1991 Gulf War Kuwait was a cooperative target. The citizens and government of Kuwait wanted the assistance of the United States. Driving out Hussein's forces was accomplished quickly and efficiently with the compliance of the nation of Kuwait.
Iraq has proven to be a different war story. Iraq did not invite the United States to enter their country. Although the United States entered on the stated premise of humanitarianism and a quest to end Hussein's reign of terror, that doesn't mean the U.S. was invited, and it doesn't mean the target is cooperative. The United States' objective to free the people of Iraq from the iron rule of Saddam Hussein and his Republican Guard was based on the plausible assumption that no human being wants to live in a state of suffering, euthanasia, and general brutality from a dictator. The United States government presumed the people of Iraq preferred freedom and democracy to the dictatorial, totalitarian government under which they lived. However, as a nation, Iraq has not proven cooperative to that objective.
Sectarian violence has kept the United States from meeting their military objective. Rather than welcoming international assistance in building a free nation, divided allegiances in the country have prolonged the military action. Many Muslim extremists view the United States as the face of the enemy, literally and spiritually. They continue to fight hard against governmental and social changes.
The lack of cooperation in Iraq is a huge indicator, according to Sullivan's model of the future of the war. It illuminates the need for target cooperation in military objectives. It does not, however, satisfy the question as to whether the probability of victory affirms or denies the call for military force to implement changes in the interest of humanitarianism.
Military force and humanitarianism, philosophically, should be mutually exclusive terms. However, often, in the face of brutality and oppression force is necessary to break the bonds of oppression. This creates a paradox which the United States government and citizens continue to grapple. It is, however, the same paradox that prompted the Declaration of Independence and the American Revolutionary War.
Sullivan reported to the UGA news service, "We can try to use brute force to kill insurgents and terrorists, but what we really need is for the population to be supportive of the government and to stop supporting the insurgents. Otherwise, every time we kill an insurgent or a terrorist, they're going to be replaced by others."
Once Sullivan developed her model, she tested it and found that her paradigm was accurate in 80% of the conflicts she examined, according to the UGA news service. Her model was used to examine the current war between the U.S. and its allies, and Iraq. Extrapolating an end to the war in Iraq based on Sullivan's model, theUGA news service estimates that there is a 26% chance of victory, in a war that could endure approximately ten years. Sullivan points out that factions, insurgents, and covert allies, such as Iran and Syria, seriously undermine the U.S. objective in Iraq.
Sullivan's conclusions regarding the war with Iraq were reported by the UGA news service as follows:
"No one could have predicted exactly what would happen after we overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein," Sullivan said. "But what my model could say was that if the population was not supportive of whatever new regime we put in power and the American strategic objective shifted from regime removal to maintaining the authority of a new government, the likelihood of a successful outcome would drop from almost 70 percent to just under 26 percent."
Sullivan's research and reporting prove timely as the fierce debate over whether to pull our troops out of Iraq rages in the United States. According to Sullivan, the chances for the successful establishment of a new government in a free and independent Iraq are slim, without the cooperation of the Iraqis and surrounding nations. The research, however, does nothing to discourage those who believe in the fight in the name of higher moral law and justice.
Sullivan's paradigm is helpful, but must be weighed against the one's acceptance of age old adage, "It's not whether you win or lose, but how (or why) you play the game." One factor that Sullivan's research did not address includes an equation which may never be quantified: How much is one life worth in the pursuit of freedom and justice for all?
Sources:
Fahmy, Sam. "UGA study finds that weaker nations prevail in 39 percent of military conflicts, UGA Office of Public Affairs News Service, June 11, 2007.
http://www.uga.edu/news/artman/publish/070611_Sullivan.shtml
http://www.uga.edu/intl/sullivan.htm
http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/3/496
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